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Abstract
With diminishing global water reserves the problem of water allocation be-
comes increasingly important. We consider the problem of eﬃciently sharing
a river among a group of satiable countries. Inducing countries to eﬃciently
cooperate requires monetary compensations via international agreements. We
show that cooperation of the other countries exerts a positive externality on
the beneﬁt of a coalition. Our problem is to distribute the beneﬁt of eﬃciently
sharing the river under these constraints. If the countries outside of a coalition
do not cooperate at all, then the downstream incremental distribution is the
unique compromise between the absolute territorial sovereignty (ATS) doctrine
and the unlimited territorial integrity (UTI) doctrine. If all countries outside
of a coalition cooperate, then there may not exist any distribution satisfying
the UTI doctrine.
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1 Introduction
In many economic and political environments the characteristics of a prisoner’s dilemma
are present: the non-cooperative equilibrium is ineﬃcient and enforcing the eﬃcient
outcome requires cooperation (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990). International agree-
ments determine how to achieve cooperation among a group of countries and specify
how to make monetary compensations to distribute the resulting beneﬁts. Examples
are the European Union, the GATT, and the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse emissions.
In all these environments the beneﬁt of a group of countries depends on how the
other countries behave. For instance in the Kyoto Protocol, if the countries outside
of the Kyoto protocol continue to pollute as before, then the beneﬁt of the countries,
which signed the protocol, is smaller than when the countries outside agreed to reduce
greenhouse emissions a protocol similar to the Kyoto one. Therefore, cooperation
of the other countries exerts an externality on the value (or beneﬁt) of a coalition
(or group) of countries. In other words, in these environments the countries play a
cooperative game with externalities.
A natural requirement of any agreement is that a subgroup of countries should not
be better oﬀ by signing a separate agreement. Otherwise it is credible to threaten the
agreement and acquire a separate one which blocks the initial one. An agreement is
stable if it is not blocked by a subgroup of countries. In the presence of externalities
the stability of an agreement depends on how the countries outside of the blocking
coalition behave. A strong stability requirement would be that the agreement which
is not blocked by a subgroup of countries independently of the behavior of the coun-
tries outside of this subgroup. Weaker stability requirements are obtained via the
two extremes of behavior of the countries outside of a coalition: either they do not
cooperate at all or they all cooperate. The non-cooperative core is non-empty if there
exists an agreement which is not blocked by a subgroup assuming that the countries
outside do not cooperate. Similarly, the cooperative core is non-empty if there exists
an agreement which is not blocked by a subgroup assuming that the countries outside
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do all cooperate.
We consider international agreements for sharing water resources of a river. The
importance of this problem has been empirically shown by Godana (1985) and Barrett
(1994). The ﬁeld of research on water allocation is increasingly important with dimin-
ishing water reserves (Young and Haveman, 1995; Carraro, Marchiori, and Sgobbi,
2005, Griﬃn, 2006). Our paper will be the ﬁrst one to consider water allocation with
externalities. We follow Kilgour and Dinar (2001) and Ambec and Sprumont (2002)
and consider a set of countries which is located along the river. Each country extracts
water from the river for consumption and/or production. The river picks up volume
along its course. Agents value water diﬀerently in the sense that some have higher
needs and higher marginal utility /productivity than others. These heterogeneous
valuations are represented by concave and single-peaked beneﬁt functions, where the
peak consumption corresponds to a country’s satiation point. Water is scarce and it
is not possible that everybody consumes his peak. Free access extraction of water
is ineﬃcient. Typically, countries located upstream consume too much (e.g. up to
their satiation points), thereby leaving not enough to supply downstream users. An
eﬃcient allocation of water maximizes the total welfare (i.e. the sum of the coun-
tries’ beneﬁts). Such an allocation may require upstream countries to limit their own
consumption in order to increase the consumption of downstream countries whose
marginal beneﬁts are higher. Clearly, inducing the upstream countries to do so re-
quires compensatory payments. These payments together with an eﬃcient allocation
of water generate a distribution of the total welfare of the grand coalition. We exam-
ine which distributions are acceptable for the countries according to certain fairness
criteria.
Kilgour and Dinar (2001) and Ambec and Sprumont (2002) considered the special
case when each country’s beneﬁt function is strictly increasing and satiation points
do not exist. This assumption appears unnatural because in reality overconsumption
may cause ﬂooding or increase sanitation costs with higher water extraction costs.
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Production function and/or utility from water consumption is therefore decreasing
after satiation (e.g. Griﬃn, 2006, Chap 2). We show that under single-peaked beneﬁt
functions the countries located along the river play a cooperative game with externali-
ties.1 The intuition is as follows. Because water is freely disposable, any country never
consumes more than his satiation point. Therefore, for a coalition it may be proﬁtable
to pass some water from one of its connected components to another although some
water is consumed by countries located in between these two components. Since the
same is true for the countries outside of a coalition, this implies that the value of a
coalition depends on how the countries of its complement cooperate or behave. For
any coalition and any partition of the countries (such that the coalition is a member
of the partition), the structure of the river naturally deﬁnes a dynamic game with
perfect information: the players are the members of the partition and the nodes of
play are given by the connected components of all members of the partition. Then
the backwards induction algorithm calculates the equilibrium water consumption plan
and the value of a coalition under the given partition is simply the sum of the beneﬁts
at the equilibrium plan of the countries belonging to the coalition.
Because property rights over water are not well deﬁned, there are two conﬂicting
doctrines invoked by riparian countries in international river disputes: the theory of
absolute territorial sovereignty (ATS) and the theory of unlimited territorial integrity
(UTI) respectively (see Godona, 1985). Core lower bounds are inspired by ATS.
Under UTI the absence of the other, a country (or group of countries) could freely
dispose of the full stream of water originating upstream from its location, thereby
enjoying a beneﬁt called “aspiration welfare”. Since water is scarce, not everybody
can enjoy its aspiration welfare. A welfare distribution that assigns to any country or
1Contrary to most of the literature on cooperative game theory, our environment does not rule
out that interactions between the other countries exert an externality on a coalition. For cooperative
games with externalities several recent papers oﬀer extensions of the Shapley value of games without
externalities (see Maskin (2003), de Clippel and Serrano (2005), Navarro (2006) and Macho-Stadler,
Pe´rez-Castrillo, and Wettstein (2006)).
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group of country more that its aspiration welfare should be perceived as unfair. The
aspiration welfare deﬁnes upper bounds on welfare for any coalition of countries.
Under non-cooperative behavior there exist distributions satisfying the core lower
bounds. Our ﬁrst main result shows that the downstream incremental distribution
is the unique distribution satisfying the non-cooperative core lower bounds and the
aspiration upper bounds. Our second main result shows that for more than three
countries, there may not exist any distribution satisfying the cooperative core lower
bounds. Therefore, the cooperative core lower bounds are above the non-cooperative
core lower bounds. In general cooperation exerts a positive externality on the value
of a coalition compared to its value under non-cooperative behavior.
Our ﬁrst two main results are consistent with the literature on international agree-
ments for pollution reduction. This literature disagrees on the stability of a global
agreement (the “grand coalition”) because of opposite assumptions about the behav-
ior of the nonmembers of an agreement. On the one hand, Chander and Tulkens
(1997) show that the non-cooperative core is non-empty, thereby leading to a “grand
coalition” agreement. On the other hand, Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) assume that
coalitions still cooperate when an individual country deviates. They conclude that
any global agreement is not stable because at least one individual country blocks it
and the core is empty.
An important work related to ours is Demange (2004). She considers hierarchies
and shows that the “hierarchical outcome” satisﬁes the core lower bounds for all
connected coalitions2 for all super-additive cooperative games. If we insist that the
core lower bounds are satisﬁed for some non-connected coalitions, then there exists a
large class of super-additive games where the “hierarchical outcome” violates the core
lower bounds. If the hierarchy is a river, then the hierarchical outcome corresponds
to the upstream incremental distribution. Both her and our work have in common
that the cooperative game is super-additive and that an incremental distribution
2A coalition S is connected if for any two countries belonging to S, any country in between those
countries also belongs to S.
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corresponding to the structure of the river (or the hierarchy) is proposed as a solution
to the game under consideration. The important diﬀerences between Demange (2004)
and our work are that here externalities do exist whereas in hers they do not and
that the downstream incremental distribution satisﬁes the non-cooperative core lower
bounds for all coalitions (connected or non-connected).
Since the core is empty, similarly to Demange (2004) we may allow only connected
coalitions to block. Even if blocking is restricted to these coalitions, the core may
still be empty. Our third main result shows that the downstream incremental distri-
bution is not blocked by any connected coalition if and only if cooperation exerts no
externality on the value of any country. Since all core lower bounds are above the
non-cooperative core lower bounds, it follows that there exists a distribution satis-
fying the aspiration upper bounds and the UTI doctrine for all connected coalitions
independently of the other countries’ behavior if and only if the individual rationality
constraints are identical under all behaviors of the other countries. Of course, by our
ﬁrst main result, the downstream incremental distribution is the only candidate for
such a distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the problem of
sharing a river among satiable agents (or countries) and we determine necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for an eﬃcient water consumption plan. In Section 3 we calculate
the value of a coalition for each partition of the agents via the backwards induction
algorithm applied to a dynamic game induced by the structure of the river and the
partition of the agents. In Section 4 we focus on non-cooperative behavior and show
that the downstream incremental distribution is the unique distribution satisfying the
non-cooperative core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds. In Section 5 we
turn to cooperative behavior and show that for more than three agents there may not
exist any distribution satisfying the cooperative core lower bounds. Furthermore, the
downstream incremental distribution satisﬁes all core lower bounds for all connected
coalitions if and only if the cooperation exerts no externality on the value of any
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agent.
2 The Problem
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents (or countries). We identify agents
with their locations along the river and number them from upstream to downstream:
i < j means that i is upstream from j. A coalition is a non-empty subset of N .
Given two coalitions S and T , we write S < T if i < j for all i ∈ S and all j ∈ T .
Given a coalition S, we denote by minS and maxS, respectively, the smallest and
largest members of S. Let Pi = {1, . . . , i} denote the set of predecessors of agent
i and P 0i = Pi\{i} denote the set of strict predecessors of agent i. Similarly, let
Fi = {i, i + 1, . . . , n} denote the set of followers of agent i and let F 0i = Fi\{i}
denote the set of strict followers of i. A coalition S is connected if for all i, j ∈ S
and all k ∈ N , i < k < j implies k ∈ S. Given a coalition S, let C(S) denote the set
of connected components of S, i.e. C(S) is the coarsest partition of S such that any
T ∈ C(S) is connected. We often omit set brackets for sets and write i instead of {i}
or v(i, j) instead of v({i, j}).
The river picks up volume along its course. We denote by ei ≥ 0 the volume which
the river picks up at agent i’s location (or in country i). Each agent is endowed with
a beneﬁt function. Let bi : R+ → R denote agent i’s beneﬁt function. We assume
that bi is diﬀerentiable for all xi > 0 and strictly concave. Furthermore, b
′
i(xi) goes to
inﬁnity as xi tends to 0 and there exists a satiation point xˆi > 0 such that b
′
i(xˆi) = 0.
In other words, xˆi is agent i’s optimal (water) consumption and if he consumes more
than xˆi, then he will infer a loss (compared to consuming xˆi) from overconsumption.
A problem is a triple (N, e, b) where e = (ei)i∈N and b = (bi)i∈N . Given a problem,
a consumption plan for N is a vector x(N) ∈ RN+ such that for all j ∈ N
∑
i∈Pj
xi(N) ≤
∑
i∈Pj
ei.
The above constraint says that the water ei, which is picked up by the river at agent
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i’s location, can only be consumed by i and the agents which are located downstream
from i. This makes our problem diﬀerent from both the allocation of a private good
with the possibility of sidepayments and queuing problems where the order of the
agents is ﬂexible and agents are compensated for the welfare maximizing queue (see
among others Maniquet (2003) and Chun (2004)).
Given a consumption plan x(N) and an agent i, let
Ei(x(N)) =
∑
j∈P 0i
(ej − xj(N))
denote the amount of water which is passed to agent i from his strict predecessors
P 0i in the consumption plan x(N) (with the convention E1(x(N)) = 0)
3.
We call x∗(N) an optimal (or eﬃcient) consumption plan if and only if it maximizes
the sum of all agents’ beneﬁts. Note that here it may be suboptimal to use all the
water
∑
i∈N ei. In particular, it is suboptimal for any agent to consume more than
xˆi. Now analogously as in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) we can show that there
exists a unique optimal consumption plan x∗(N) (uniqueness follows from the strict
concavity of the bi) and that for x
∗(N) there exists a partition {Nk}k=1,...,K of N and
a list (βk)
K
k=1 of non-negative numbers such that
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Nk < Nk′ and βk > βk′ whenever k < k
′ (1)
b′i(x
∗
i (N)) = βk for every i ∈ Nk and every k = 1, . . . , K (2)
x∗i (N) ≤ xˆi for all i ∈ N (3)
∑
i∈Nk
(x∗i (N)− ei) = 0 for every k = 1, . . . , K − 1. (4)
Thus, if x∗i (N) = xˆi, then i ∈ NK , i.e. the saturated agents belong to the last member
NK of the partition.
3Agent 1 does not receive any water from the other agents because agent 1 occupies the ﬁrst
location of the river.
4For a detailed description of the eﬃcient allocation of water along a river, see Kilgour and Dinar
(2001).
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Furthermore, we make the following observation. Suppose that for some agent
we have ei > xˆi. Then by (3), agent i will never consume more than xˆi, i.e. he will
always dispose ei− xˆi. Deﬁne e′i = min{xˆi, ei} and e′i+1 = ei+1 +(ei− e′i) and set e′ =
(e−i,i+1, e′i, e
′
i+1).
5 Then from (1)-(4) we obtain that x∗(N) is an optimal consumption
plan for the problem (N, e, b) if and only if x∗(N) is an optimal consumption plan for
the problem (N, e′, b). Thus, from now on we may suppose without loss of generality
that in the problem (N, e, b) we have ei ≤ xˆi for all i ∈ N .
Money is available in unbounded quantities to perform side-payments. Agent i’s
utility from consuming xi units of water and the monetary transfer ti is ui(xi, ti) =
bi(xi) + ti. An allocation is a tuple (x(N), t(N)) where x(N) is a consumption plan
for N and t(N) ∈ RN is a vector of monetary transfers such that∑i∈N ti(N) ≤ 0. A
(welfare) distribution is any vector z = (z1 . . . , zn) ∈ RN which is the utility image of
some allocation (x(N), t(N)) in the sense that zi = bi(xi(N)) + ti(N) for all i ∈ N .
We distribute the maximal welfare
∑
i∈N bi(x
∗
i (N)) among the agents.
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3 Externalities and Core Lower Bounds
Since each agent’s beneﬁt function is single-peaked, any agent never consumes more
than his satiation point. If marginal beneﬁts are higher for agents located more
downstream, then it may be proﬁtable for a coalition to pass some water from one
component to another component even though some of the passed water is consumed
by agents in between the two components. Therefore, the value of a coalition may be
greater than the sum of the values of its connected components. However, it may be
also proﬁtable for the agents outside of S to pass some water from one component
to the next one leaving some water for consumption for the agents in S. Hence,
the value of a coalition S will depend on both the components of S and the behavior
5If i = n, then we set e′ = (e−n, e′n), i.e. the amount en − xˆn is not consumed by any agent.
6Note that any vector z ∈ RN such that ∑i∈N zi =
∑
i∈N bi(x
∗
i (N)) is a distribution because it
is the utility image of (x∗(N), t∗(N)) where t∗i (N) = zi − bi(x∗i (N)) for all i ∈ N .
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of the agents outside of S. In other words, the behavior of the agents outside of S
exerts an externality on the value of coalition S. In what follows we will assume
that the agents outside of S form a partition and each member of the partition is
maximizing its surplus for any amount of water which is not used by the predecessors.
Furthermore, by the structure of the river, any amount of unused water can only be
transferred downstream and each member of the partition is maximizing its surplus
at any of its connected components for any amount of water, which is not used by
the predecessors of this connected component. Therefore, the outcome is a “subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game with perfect information given by the
river”.
Let v(S,P) denote the value of S when the partition P of N forms where S ∈ P .
The calculation of v(S,P) follows the simple backwards induction algorithm along
the river. Here each coalition belonging to P is a player in the extensive form game
with perfect information (given by the river). The nodes of play are given by the
connected components of all coalitions in P . Information is perfect because at any
node of play the amount of unused water from the strict predecessors is observed (or
equivalently the consumptions of the strict predecessors are observed). A subgame
consists of an initial node of play and an amount of unused water which is passed
to the initial node of play by its strict predecessors. In the subgame each node of
play, which (weakly) follows the initial one, receives an amount of unused water from
its strict predecessors (or equivalently observes the consumption plans chosen by the
previous nodes) and chooses a feasible consumption plan given this amount of unused
water. The backwards induction algorithm calculates for each subgame the feasible
consumption plan of the initial node which maximizes the sum of their beneﬁts plus
the sum of the beneﬁts of all components which belong to the same coalition and
are further down the river. Here the reactions of the components further down the
river are already given by the amount of water which the initial component passes
to the following component. The outcome of the backwards induction algorithm is
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the consumption plan of the (sub)game starting with the ﬁrst component of the river
(agent 1 belongs to this component) and no amount of unused water is received by
this ﬁrst component. Then v(S,P) is equal to the sum of the beneﬁts all agents
belonging to S receive in the outcome of the backwards algorithm.
Formally, let ∪T∈PC(T ) = {T1, . . . , Tk} be such that T1 < · · · < Tk. The backwards
induction algorithm calculates for each component and each amount of unused water
received by this component a feasible consumption plan which is optimal for this
component and the components further down the river which belong to the same
coalition:7
(k) For all E ′ ≥ 0, let x∗(Tk, E ′) be the optimal consumption plan for (Tk, (eminTk +
E ′, eTk\{minTk}), bTk);
(k-1) For all E ′ ≥ 0, let x∗(Tk−1, E ′) be the optimal consumption plan for (Tk−1, (eminTk−1+
E ′, eTk−1\{minTk−1}), bTk−1); note that Tk−1 and Tk necessarily belong to diﬀerent
members of P ; after the choice of x∗(Tk−1, E ′), the amount Ek(x∗(Tk−1, E ′)) =
E ′ +
∑
i∈Tk−1(ei − x∗i (Tk−1, E ′)) of unused water is passed from Tk−1 to Tk and
Tk chooses the consumption plan x
∗(Tk, Ek(x∗(Tk−1, E ′))).
...
(l) Given E ′ and the volume the river picks up along the locations in Tl, x(Tl, E ′)
is a feasible consumption plan for Tl if E
′ +
∑
i∈Tl∩Pj(ei − xi(Tl, E ′)) ≥ 0 for all
j ∈ Tl. By backwards induction, suppose that for all components Tl′ following Tl
(l′ ∈ {l+1, . . . , k}) and all amounts of water E ′ ≥ 0 we have deﬁned x∗(Tl′ , E ′).
Given these choices, a ﬁxed E ′ ≥ 0 and a feasible consumption plan x(Tl, E ′), let
El+1(x(Tl, E
′)) = E ′+
∑
i∈Tl(ei−xi(Tl, E ′)) be the amount of water passed from
Tl to Tl+1, let El+2(x(Tl, E
′)) = El+2(x∗(Tl+1, El+1(x(Tl, E ′)))) be the amount
of water passed from Tl and Tl+1 to Tl+2, and in general, for t ∈ {1, . . . , k − l},
7For any S ⊆ N , let bS = (bi)i∈S and eS = (ei)i∈S .
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let El+t(x(Tl, E
′)) = El+t(x∗(Tl+t−1, El+t−1(x(Tl, E ′)))) be the amount of water
passed from Tl, . . . , Tl+t−1 to Tl+t.
Let T ∈ P be such that Tl ⊆ T . Then for all E ′ ≥ 0, let x∗(Tl, E ′) be the
consumption plan for Tl which solves
max
x(Tl,E′)
∑
i∈Tl
bi(xi(Tl, E
′)) +
∑
l′∈{l+1,...,k}:Tl′⊆T
∑
i∈Tl′
bi(xi(Tl′ , El′(x(Tl, E
′))))
where x(Tl, E
′) is a feasible consumption plan for Tl given E ′. In other words,
x(Tl, E
′) maximizes the surplus of T in the subgame starting at Tl given E ′ and
how the other components react on any amount of water which arrives at each
component following Tl.
...
From the concavity of the bi we obtain that each component’s optimal consumption
plan is unique. We denote the outcome of the backwards induction algorithm ap-
plied to P by xP(N) where xPT1(N) = x∗(T1, 0) and for all l ∈ {2, . . . , k}, xPTl(N) =
x∗(Tl, El(x∗(T1, 0))). Then for S ∈ P we deﬁne
v(S,P) =
∑
i∈S
bi(x
P
i (N)).
Remark 1 The outcome of the backwards induction algorithm may not be unique
because some coalitions may be indiﬀerent between passing water and not passing any
water. For example, if there are three agents, then coalition {1, 3} may be indiﬀerent
between passing some water from 1 to 3 (and losing some water to agent 2) and
not passing any water (and agents 1 and 3, respectively, consume e1 and e3). In
the rare case of indiﬀerence at the outcome xP(N), we assume that any coalition is
passing water instead of not passing any water. Given P , this assumption ensures that
the value of any coalition S ∈ P is maximal among all outcomes of the backwards
induction algorithm. Because we do not know which subgame perfect equilibrium
will arise from P , it is sensible to require that the core lower bounds are met for all
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outcomes of the backward induction algorithm. By the above fact, this is equivalent
to the core lower bounds for the outcome of the backwards induction algorithm where
in the case of indiﬀerence under xP(N) water is passed.
Of course, it is a Nash equilibrium where any connected component consumes
any amount of passed water. At the outcome of this equilibrium no water is passed
between any two connected components belonging to the same coalition. However,
this equilibrium is not credible because by the structure of the river water is passed
only downstream and the connected components, which are located more downstream,
will not consume more than their satiation points. Therefore, we need to focus on
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The two extremes of behavior of the agents outside of S are the following: either
they do not cooperate at all or they all cooperate.
Non-Cooperative Core Lower Bounds: For all coalitions S, let v(S) = v(S, {S}∪
{{i}|i ∈ N\S}).
Cooperative Core Lower Bounds: For all coalitions S, let v(S) = v(S, {S,N\S}).
We say that cooperation exerts no externality on a coalition S if for any partition
P of N such that S ∈ P ,
v(S) = v(S,P).
Then the value of a coalition is independent of the interactions of the other agents. We
say that cooperation exerts a positive externality on a coalition S if for any partition
P of N such that S ∈ P ,
v(S) ≤ v(S,P).
Then cooperation does not decrease the value of a coalition compared to the value
under non-cooperative behavior.
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The following proposition contains some basic relations among the core lower
bounds of a coalition for diﬀerent behaviors of its complement. First, cooperation
exerts a positive externality on a coalition. Therefore, the non-cooperative core lower
bound of a coalition is the smallest core lower bound of all possible behaviors of
its complement and non-cooperative behavior of the other agents is the pessimistic
expectation for a coalition. This also implies that the non-cooperative core lower
bounds are below the cooperative core lower bounds and the cooperative core lower
bounds are more demanding than the non-cooperative lower bounds. Finally, the
following super-additivity property is true: for any partition of N , if two coalitions
belonging to the partition merge, then their joint payoﬀ does not fall compared to
the payoﬀ when they are separate.
Proposition 1 Let P be partition of N and S ∈ P.
(i) v(S) ≤ v(S,P).
(ii) v(S) ≤ v(S).
(iii) For any two disjoint coalitions S, T ∈ P, v(S,P)+v(T,P) ≤ v(S∪T,P ′) where
P ′ = (P\{S, T}) ∪ {S ∪ T}.
Proof. Note that (ii) follows from (i). We show (i): let P = {S} ∪ {{i}|i ∈ N\S}
and C(S) = {S1, . . . , Sk} where S1 < · · · < Sk. Because ei ≤ xˆi for all i ∈ N
and under P behavior is non-cooperative, we have EminS1(xP(N)) = 0 and for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, EmaxSl+1(xP(N)) ≥ EminSl+1(xP(N)), i.e. the agents between
any two connected components Sl and Sl+1 consume their peak or the amount of
water which is entering the river at their location. Consider a subgame starting at Sl
(l ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}) and let Sl pass the amount E ′ > 0 of unused water to maxSl +1.
If this is proﬁtable for S in the subgame starting at Sl under P , then all agents
between Sl and Sl+1 consume their peak. Under P , in the subgame starting at Sl,
each agent between Sl and Sl+1 either consumes his peak or less. Therefore, for any
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E ′ > 0 which is proﬁtable for S under P , under P at least the same amount of unused
water is passed to minSl+1 as under P . Hence, given such an E ′, the set of possible
water consumptions which Sl+1 can choose under P is a superset set of the possible
water consumptions which Sl+1 can choose under P . Since the this argument holds
for S1 and x
P(N) is a Nash equilibrium, we must have v(S,P) ≥ v(S,P).
We show (iii): xP
′
(N) is the outcome of the backwards induction algorithm under
P ′ and therefore, xP ′(N) is a Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game under prefect
information given by the river. If coalition S ∪ T plays alternatively xPS∪T (N), then
the outcome of the backwards induction algorithm is xP(N). Therefore,
v(S ∪ T,P ′) =
∑
i∈S∪T
bi(x
P ′
i (N)) ≥
∑
i∈S∪T
bi(x
P
i (N)) = v(S,P) + v(T,P),
the desired conclusion. 
Remark 2 By (iii) of Proposition 1, starting from any partition P of N , the only
fully eﬃcient allocation is that the grand coalition N forms and chooses the eﬃcient
consumption plan. If we suppose that the agents choose an eﬃcient allocation, then
the grand coalition must form. We distribute the N -maximal welfare
∑
i∈N bi(x
∗
i (N))
among the agents under the constraints v(S,P) where S ∈ P .
It is obvious from our deﬁnition that the value of a coalition consisting of an agent
and his predecessors is independent of how the other agents behave, i.e. for all i ∈ N
and all Pi ∈ P we have
v(Pi) = v(Pi,P) = v(Pi).
Thus, cooperation exerts no externality on the coalition Pi. Even though the value of
a coalition may depend on how the other agents behave, the structure of the river in-
duces a unique natural incremental distribution, namely the downstream incremental
distribution z∗: for all i ∈ N , let
z∗i = v(Pi)− v(P 0i).
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4 Non-Cooperative Core Lower Bounds and Aspi-
ration Upper Bounds
The aspiration upper bounds are implied by the UTI doctrine. Contrary to the core
lower bounds, these upper bounds do not depend on how the agents outside of a
coalition behave. The aspiration welfare of a coalition S is the highest welfare it
could achieve in the absence of N\S. It is obtained by choosing a consumption plan
y(S) ∈ RS+ maximizing
∑
i∈S bi(yi(S)) subject to the constraints
∑
i∈Pj∩S
yi(S) ≤
∑
i∈Pj
ei for all j ∈ S.
Since all beneﬁt functions are strictly concave, the maximization problem has a unique
solution, which we denote by y∗(S). Then the aspiration welfare of S is
w(S) =
∑
i∈S
bi(y
∗
i (S)).
A distribution z satisﬁes the aspiration upper bounds if
∑
i∈S zi ≤ w(S) for all coali-
tions S. In the Lockean tradition, coalition S has a legitimate right to the welfare level
w(S) but not to more. Unfortunately the aspirations of two complementary coalitions
S and N\S are incompatible: w(S) + w(N\S) > v(N). It is even the case that for
any partition P of N such that S ∈ P we have ∑T∈P w(T ) > v(N), i.e. the aspi-
ration of S is never compatible with the aspiration(s) of N\S independently of how
N\S cooperates. Therefore, if ∑i∈S zi > w(S), then
∑
i∈N\S zi <
∑
T∈P:T =S w(T ).
This means that S beneﬁts from the existence of N\S while N\S suﬀers from the
existence of S. If none of the agents bears any responsibility for the existence of the
others, no coalition is ought to enjoy more than its aspiration upper bound.
Remark 3 Both the ATS and the UTI doctrines are also inspired by Moulin’s (1990)
group externalities depending on how we deﬁne property rights over water. In the
absence of the other agents and the water entering the river at their locations, any
agent i enjoys v(i). Since
∑
i∈N v(i) ≤ v(N), then our problem has positive group
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externalities and any agent i should receive at least v(i). This inspires the ATS
doctrine for individuals and groups. In the absence of the other agents and the
presence of the water entering the river at their locations, any agent enjoys i enjoys
w(i). Since
∑
i∈N w(i) ≥ v(N), then our problem has negative group externalities
and any agent i should receive at most w(i). This inspires the UTI doctrine for
individuals and groups.
Remark 4 There is an obvious relation between the non-cooperative core lower
bounds and the aspiration upper bounds: v(Pi) = w(Pi) for all i ∈ N . Now the
following is easy to show: if a distribution satisﬁes the non-cooperative lower bounds
and the aspiration upper bounds, then it must be the downstream incremental dis-
tribution.8
The main challenge of our paper is to ﬁnd distributions which satisfy core lower
bounds. These bounds depend on the behavior of the agents outside of a coalition.
In the case of non-cooperative behavior, there are distributions satisfying the core
lower bounds. It turns out that in the presence of optimal water consumptions and
non-cooperative behavior, the downstream incremental distribution is the only com-
promise between the ATS and the UTI doctrines.
Theorem 1 The downstream incremental distribution is the unique distribution sat-
isfying the non-cooperative core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds.
Proof. By Remark 4, if a distribution z satisﬁes the non-cooperative core lower
bounds and the aspiration upper bounds, then we must have z = z∗.
Next we show that z∗ satisﬁes the non-cooperative lower bounds. Let S be con-
nected and P = {S} ∪ {{i}|i ∈ N\S}. Because behavior is non-cooperative, we have
8The proof is identical to Ambec and Sprumont (2002): Let z be a distribution satisfying the
non-cooperative lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds. Since v(1) = w(1), we have z1 =
v(1) = z∗1 . Let zi = z
∗
i for all i < j ≤ n. Since v(Pj) = w(Pj), we have
∑
i∈Pj zi = v(Pj). Thus,
by
∑
i∈P 0j zi =
∑
i∈P 0j z
∗
i = v(P
0j), we obtain zj = v(Pj)−
∑
i∈P 0j zi = v(Pj)− v(P 0j) = z∗j , the
desired conclusion.
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for all i ∈ P 0 minS, xPi (N) = ei. Thus, EminS(xP(N)) = 0. Since S is connected,
{S, P 0 minS} is a partition of P maxS. Hence, by EminS(xP(N)) = 0,
v(P maxS) ≥ v(S) + v(P 0 minS).
Thus, for any connected S,
∑
i∈S
z∗i = v(P maxS)− v(P 0 minS) ≥ v(S). (5)
Before we proceed, we note the following: for all i ∈ N we have v(P 0i)+bi(xˆi) ≥ v(Pi).
Thus, for all i ∈ N ,
bi(xˆi) ≥ v(Pi)− v(P 0i) = z∗i . (6)
Let S be an arbitrary coalition and let P = {S} ∪ {{i}|i ∈ N\S}. Since ei ≤ xˆi
for all i ∈ N , we have ∑i∈P 0 minS(xPi (N) − ei) = 0. Hence, EminS(xP(N)) = 0. Let
C(S) = {S1, . . . , SL} where S1 < S2 < · · · < SL. Choose the minimal l ∈ {1, . . . , L}
such that EmaxSl+1(x
P(N)) = 0 and set T1 = ∪lt=1St. Then, by ei ≤ xˆi for all
i ∈ N , again we have EminSl+1(xP(N)) = 0. Now choose the l′ > l minimal such that
EmaxSl′+1(x
P(N)) = 0 and set T2 = ∪l′t=l+1St. Continuing this way we ﬁnd a partition
T = {T1, T2, . . . , TM} of S. By construction, T1 < T2 < · · · < TM and
v(S) =
∑
T∈T
v(T ). (7)
For each T ∈ T , let T¯ = P maxT\P 0 minT . Then by deﬁnition of T , we have for all
i ∈ T¯\T , Ei(xP(N)) > 0 and therefore, xPi (N) = xˆi for all i ∈ T¯\T . Now we have
∑
T∈T
∑
i∈T¯
z∗i ≥
∑
T∈T
v(T¯ )
≥
∑
T∈T
(v(T ) +
∑
i∈T¯\T
bi(xˆi))
= v(S) +
∑
T∈T
∑
i∈T¯\T
bi(xˆi),
where the ﬁrst equality follows from (5) and the fact that each T¯ is connected, the
second inequality follows from the fact that xPi (N) = xˆi for all i ∈ T¯\T and the
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consumption plan (xPi (N))i∈T¯ is feasible for T¯ , and the equality follows from (7).
Therefore, we have
∑
i∈S
z∗i =
∑
T∈T
∑
i∈T
z∗i ≥ v(S) +
∑
T∈T
∑
i∈T¯\T
(bi(xˆi)− z∗i ).
From (6) we know that bi(xˆi)− z∗i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Hence,
∑
i∈S z
∗
i ≥ v(S) and z∗
satisﬁes the non-cooperative core lower bounds.
The proof that z∗ satisﬁes the aspiration upper bounds uses the following lemma
which we prove in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 If S ⊆ T ⊆ N and T < i, then w(S ∪ i)− w(S) ≥ w(T ∪ i)− w(T ).
Then for any coalition S we obtain
∑
i∈S
z∗i =
∑
i∈S
(w(Pi)− w(P 0i)) ≤
∑
i∈S
(w(Pi ∩ S)− w(P 0i ∩ S)) = w(S),
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the last equality follows from the fact
that all terms cancel out except w(P maxS ∩ S) = w(S) and −w(P 0 minS ∩ S) =
w(∅) = 0. 
Remark 5 It can be easily checked that Theorem 1 and its proof remain true if
agents are allowed to have beneﬁt functions which either have a satiation point or
are strictly increasing (as in Ambec and Sprumont (2002)). Therefore, Theorem 1
generalizes the theorem of Ambec and Sprumont (2002). In the presence of satiation
points the main diﬀerence and (non-trivial) diﬃculty is to show that the downstream
incremental distribution satisﬁes the non-cooperative core lower bounds. In Ambec
and Sprumont (2002) this was straightforward because with strictly increasing beneﬁt
functions it is never optimal for a coalition to pass water from one component to
another and cooperation exerts no externality on any coalition. Therefore, their game
is consecutive (Greenberg and Weber, 1986) meaning that the value of a coalition
equals the sum of the values of its connected components. Then for showing that a
distribution satisﬁes the core lower bounds, it is suﬃcient to show that the distribution
satisﬁes the core lower bounds for connected coalitions.
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5 (Cooperative) Core Lower Bounds
When the agents’ behavior is non-cooperative, the downstream incremental distribu-
tion satisﬁes the core lower bounds. We investigate whether there are distributions
satisfying the core lower bounds when agents cooperate, i.e. once a coalition S forms
the complement N\S can also from coalitions. First, we focus on the other extreme
of non-cooperative behavior, namely on cooperative behavior.
Contrary to non-cooperative behavior, the downstream incremental distribution
may violate the cooperative core lower bounds when there are at least three agents.
Note that for two agents we have v = v and the non-cooperative core lower bounds
and the cooperative core lower bounds are identical.
Example 1 (the downstream incremental distribution may violate the cooperative
core lower bounds) Let N = {1, 2, 3}, e1 = e2 = 56 , e3 = 0, and b1 = b2 and b3 = 100b1
be such that xˆ1 = xˆ2 = xˆ3 = 1. Then x
{{1,2},{3}}
1 (N) = x
{{1,2},{3}}
2 (N) =
5
6
and
z∗2 = v({1, 2})− v(1) = b2(56). Consider {2} and {{2}, {1, 3}}. Since b3 = 100b1, it is
obvious that b1(
5
6
) + b3(0) < b1(0) + b3(
4
6
). Therefore, coalition {1, 3} chooses to pass
water from 1 to 3 and we have both E2(x
{{2},{1,3}}(N)) > 0 and 5
6
< x
{{2},{1,3}}
2 (N) ≤ 1.
Hence, v(2) = b2(x
{{2},{1,3}}
2 (N)) > b2(
5
6
) = z∗2 and the downstream incremental
distribution z∗ violates the cooperative core lower bounds.
It is easy to extend Example 1 for n > 3. Now one may wonder whether other
distributions satisfy the cooperative core lower bounds. For three agents, the answer
is positive and the cooperative core is non-empty.
Proposition 2 For N = {1, 2, 3} there exists always a distribution satisfying the
cooperative core lower bounds.
Proof. Let n = 3. If v¯(2) ≤ v(1, 2) − v(2) then, since v(Pi) = v¯(Pi) and
v(Fi) = v¯(Fi) for every i ∈ N and v(1, 3) = v¯(1, 3), then the downstream incre-
mental distribution z∗ satisﬁes the cooperative core lower bounds.
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Suppose now that v¯(2) ≥ v(1, 2)− v(1). We show that the distribution z1 = v¯(1),
z2 = v¯(2), z3 = v¯(1, 2, 3) − v¯(1) − v¯(2) satisﬁes the cooperative core lower bounds.
First, note that z3 = v¯(3)+v¯(1, 2, 3)−v¯(1)−v¯(2)−v¯(3) and v¯(1)+v¯(3) = v(1)+v(3) ≤
v(1, 3) = v¯(1, 3). These two relationships imply z3 ≥ v¯(3) + v¯(1, 2, 3)− v¯(1, 3)− v¯(2)
which leads to z3 ≥ v¯(3) because v¯(1, 2, 3) ≥ v¯(1, 3) + v¯(2). Second, substituting
our initial assumption v¯(2) ≥ v(1, 2) − v(1) into z1 + z2 = v¯(1) + v¯(2) shows that
z1 + z2 ≥ v(1, 2) = v¯(1, 2). Third, z1 + z3 = v¯(1, 2, 3) − v¯(2) ≥ v¯(1, 3) because
v¯(1, 2, 3) ≥ v¯(1, 3) + v¯(2). Similarly z2 + z3 = v¯(1, 2, 3) − v¯(1) ≥ v¯(2, 3) because
v¯(1, 2, 3) ≥ v¯(2, 3) + v¯(1). The other cooperative core lower bounds are obviously
satisﬁed. 
Unfortunately Proposition 2 is true only for three agents. When the downstream
incremental distribution violates the cooperative core lower bounds, for more than
three agents there may not exist another (alternative) distribution satisfying the
cooperative core lower bounds. Therefore, similarly as in Carraro and Siniscalco
(1993) the cooperative core may be empty for more than three agents.
Theorem 2 When there are more than three agents all distributions may violate the
cooperative core lower bounds.
The following example establishes Theorem 2.
Example 2 (The cooperative core may be empty) Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the beneﬁt
functions b be such that b1(x) = 50x − x22 for all x ∈ [20, 100], b2(x) = b3(x) =
100x − 10x2 for all x ∈ [3, 10] and b4(x) = 2b1(x). The river inﬂows are e1 = 33,
e2 = e3 = 4, e4 = 37.
We show that v¯(2) = b2(xˆ2), v¯(3) = b3(xˆ3), and v¯(1, 2, 3, 4) < v(1) + v¯(2) +
v¯(3) + v(4). The last condition implies that no distribution satisﬁes each agent i’s
cooperative core lower bound v¯(i) (note that v(1) = v¯(1) and v(4) = v¯(4)).
First, the optimal consumption plan x∗(N) solves the maximization program de-
ﬁned by v¯(1, 2, 3, 4). Because b4 = 2b1, x
∗(N) equalizes agents’ marginal beneﬁts, i.e.,
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50−x∗1(N) = 100−20x∗2(N) = 100−20x∗3(N) = 100−2x∗4(N), and satisﬁes the global
resource constraint x∗1(N) + x
∗
2(N) + x
∗
3(N) + x
∗
4(N) = e1 + e2 + e3 + e4 = 78. The
solution is (30, 4, 4, 40). Therefore v¯(1, 2, 3, 4) = b1(30)+b2(4)+b3(4)+b4(40) = 3930.
Second, we show that coalition {1, 3, 4} chooses to pass three units of water from
1 to {3, 4}. Therefore, 2 consumes xˆ2 = 5 units of water and v¯(2) = b2(xˆ2). Doing so,
coalition {1, 3, 4} loses xˆ2 − e2 = 1 unit of water (which is consumed by 2) and 1, 3,
and 4, respectively, can consume 30, 4, and 39 units of water. The welfare achieved is
b1(30)+b3(4)+b4(39) = 3690. If no water is passed from 1 to {3, 4}, then 1 consumes
e1 = 33 and 3 and 4 share optimally 41 units of water by consuming respectively
41
11
and 410
11
. The welfare is then b1(33) + b3(
41
11
) + b4(
410
11
) ≈ 3677.32 < 3690.
Third, we show that the coalition {1, 2, 4} chooses to pass three units of water
from {1, 2} to 4. Therefore, 3 consumes xˆ3 = 5 units of water and v¯(3) = b3(xˆ3).
Doing so, coalition {1, 2, 4} loses xˆ3 − e3 = 1 unit of water (which is consumed by 3)
and 1 and 2, respectively, can consume 30 and 4 units whereas 4 consumes e4+2 = 39
units. The welfare achieved is b1(30) + b2(4) + b4(39) = 3690. If no water is passed
from {1, 2} to 4, then 1 and 2 share optimally e1+e2 = 37 units of water by consuming
respectively (approximatively) 32.9 and 4.1 and 4 consumes e4 = 37. The welfare is
then b1(32.9) + b3(4.1) + b4(37) ≈ 3676.7 < 3690.
Finally, v(1) + v¯(2) + v¯(3) + v(4) = b1(e1) + b2(xˆ2) + b3(xˆ3) + b4(e4) = b1(33) +
b2(5) + b3(5) + b4(37) = 3936.5 > 3930 = v¯(1, 2, 3, 4). Hence, all distributions violate
the cooperative core lower bounds.
Given Theorem 2, next we investigate when there exist distributions satisfying
the core lower bounds. When the expectations of any coalition are pessimistic, the
downstream incremental distribution satisﬁes the core lower bounds. When the ex-
pectations of any coalition are optimistic, there may not be any distribution satis-
fying the core lower bounds. This is even true if blocking is restricted to connected
coalitions (see Example 2). Similarly to Demange (2004) allowing blocking only for
connected coalitions is natural for a river because cooperation is easier for connected
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coalitions. By Proposition 1, all core lower bounds are greater than or equal to the
non-cooperative core lower bounds. Hence, by Theorem 1, if a distribution is a com-
promise between the UTI doctrine and the ATS doctrine for all connected coalitions
under optimistic expectations, then it must coincide with the downstream incremental
distribution.
Theorem 3 The following are equivalent:
(i) The downstream incremental distribution satisﬁes for any connected coalition
all core lower bounds, i.e.
∑
i∈S z
∗
i ≥ v(S,P) for all connected coalitions S and
all partitions P of N such that S ∈ P.
(ii) Cooperation exerts no externality on the value of any agent, i.e. v(i) = v(i,P)
for all i ∈ N and all partitions P of N such that {i} ∈ P.
Proof. (i)⇒(ii): Let z∗ satisfy all core lower bounds for all connected coalitions. Let
i ∈ N and P be a partition of N such that {i} ∈ P. Since {i} is connected, we have
v(Pi)− v(P 0i) = z∗i ≥ v(i,P). Hence, by v(i,P) = bi(xPi (N)),
v(Pi) ≥ v(P 0i) + bi(xPi (N)). (8)
On the other hand, by
∑
j∈P 0i x
{P 0i,N\P 0i}
j (N) =
∑
j∈P 0i ej ≥
∑
j∈P 0i x
{Pi,N\Pi}
j (N),
x
{Pi,N\Pi}
P 0i (N) is a consumption plan for P
0i. Therefore, v(P 0i) ≥∑j∈P 0i bj(x{Pi,N\Pi}j (N))
and
v(P 0i) + bi(x
{Pi,N\Pi}
i (N)) ≥ v(Pi). (9)
Hence, from (8) and (9) we obtain bi(x
{Pi,N\Pi}
i (N)) ≥ bi(xPi (N)). Since agent i’s
consumption is always smaller than or equal to xˆi and bi is strictly increasing between
0 and xˆi, the previous inequality is equivalent to
x
{Pi,N\Pi}
i (N) ≥ xPi (N) (10)
By {i} ∈ P , we have xPi (N) ∈ {ei, xˆi}. If xPi (N) = ei, then v(i,P) = bi(ei) = v(i), the
desired conclusion. If xPi (N) = ei, then xPi (N) = xˆi. Hence, by (10), x{Pi,N\Pi}i (N) =
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xˆi, and by xˆi ≥ ei, xˆi > ei. But then, by x{Pi,N\Pi}i (N) = xˆi > ei, we have
∑
j∈P 0i
x
{Pi,N\Pi}
j (N) <
∑
j∈P 0i
ej.
Therefore,
∑
j∈P 0i
bj(x
{Pi,N\Pi}
j (N)) < v(P
0i). (11)
Hence,
v(Pi) =
∑
j∈P 0i
bj(x
{Pi,N\Pi}
j (N)) + bi(x
{Pi,N\Pi}
i (N)) < v(P
0i) + bi(xˆi),
where the inequality follows from (11) and x
{Pi,N\Pi}
i (N) = xˆi. Now, by x
P
i (N) = xˆi,
this inequality contradicts (8). Thus, we have to have xPi (N) = ei and v(i,P) = v(i)
for all i ∈ N and all P such that {i} ∈ P.
(ii)⇒(i): Let S be a connected coalition and P be a partition such that S ∈ P .
We show v(S) = v(S,P). Since S is connected, we have either v(S) = v(S,P) or
v(S) < v(S,P) =∑i∈S bi(xˆi). Suppose that
v(S) < v(S,P) =
∑
i∈S
bi(xˆi). (12)
Then there exists i ∈ S such that ei < xˆi. Let P ′ = (P\S) ∪ {{j}|j ∈ S}. By (12),
xPj (N) = xˆj for all j ∈ S. Then xP(N) is also the outcome of the backwards induction
algorithm when agents cooperate according to P ′. Hence, xP ′j (N) = xˆj for all j ∈ S
and v(i,P ′) = bi(xˆi). Since ei < xˆi and v(i) = bi(ei), we obtain v(i) < v(i,P ′), which
contradicts (ii). Hence, (12) was wrong and we have v(S) = v(S,P).
By Theorem 1, z∗ satisﬁes the non-cooperative core lower bounds. Hence, by
v(S) = v(S,P) for all connected coalitions S and all partitions P such that S ∈ P,
z∗ satisﬁes for any connected coalition all core lower bounds, the desired conclusion.
By Theorem 3, the downstream incremental distribution satisﬁes all core lower
bounds for all connected coalitions if and only if the the individual rationality con-
straints are identical under all behaviors of the other agents. Condition (ii) of The-
orem 3 is trivially satisﬁed in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) because in their paper
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no coalition is passing water from one of its connected components to another one
independently of the behavior of the other agents.
Remark 6 The equivalence in Theorem 3 does not remain true under cooperative
behavior. Below we provide an example showing that v(i) = v(i) for all i ∈ N but
the downstream incremental distribution violates a cooperative core lower bound for
a connected coalition.
By Proposition 1, cooperation exerts a positive externality on a coalition (com-
pared to non-cooperative behavior). Then one may wonder whether starting from any
partition “more” cooperation of the other agents always exerts a positive externality
on the value of a coalition. Here “more” cooperation means that from a partition we
obtain a coarser partition by merging some coalitions. If this were true, then the co-
operative core lower bound of a coalition is maximal among all core lower bounds for
all behaviors of the other agents. The following example shows that merging of some
coalitions may exhibit a negative externality on the value of a coalition (compared to
the value of the coalition before the merger).9
Example 3 (For a coalition the cooperative core lower bound may not be maximal
among all core lower bounds) Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the beneﬁt functions b be such
that b1(x) = 50x − x22 for all x ∈ [20, 100], b2(x) = b3(x) = 100x − 10x2 for all
x ∈ [3, 10] and b4(x) = 2b1(x). The river inﬂows are e1 = 33, e2 = 4, e3 = xˆ3 = 5,
e4 = 35.
We show the following: v(i) = v(i) for all i ∈ N and v(2) < v(2, {{1, 4}, {2}, {3}}) =
b2(xˆ2). Therefore, if coalitions {1, 4} and {3} merge, then {2} obtains strictly less
than v(2, {{1, 4}, {2}, {3}}). The welfare achieved by a coalition might decrease with
a coarser partition of its complement.
First, we show that {1, 4} passes some water from 1 to 4 and 2 consumes his
peak xˆ2 under the partition {{1, 4}, {2}, {3}}, i.e. v(2, {{1, 4}, {2}, {3}}) = b2(xˆ2).
9This is in contrast to industrial environments where collusive agreements or cartes reduce market
competition or R&D agreements with spillovers.
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Without passing water, the welfare achieved by {1, 4} is b1(e1) + b4(e4) = b1(33) +
b4(35) =
6761
2
= 3380.5. By passing some water, the coalition looses 1 unit of water
(consumed by 2 because xˆ2 − e2 = 1), and agents 1 and 4 share optimally 33+35-
1=67. They equalize marginal beneﬁts 50− x1 = 100− 2x4 and satisfy the resource
constraint x1 + x4 = 67. Thus, 1 and 4, respectively, consume 28 and 39. Their
welfare is b1(28) + b4(39) = 3387 > 3380.5.
Second, we show that if 3 joins the coalition {1, 4}, then coalition {1, 3, 4} chooses
not to pass any water from 1 to {3, 4}. Doing so 3 and 4 share optimally e3 + e4
and they consume respectively 40
11
and 400
11
. Then the welfare achieved by {1, 3, 4} is
b1(33) + b3(
40
11
) + b4(
400
11
) = 80321
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> 3650. If some water is passed from 1 to {3, 4},
then e1 + e3 + e4 − 1 = 72 units of water are shared optimally between the members
of {1, 3, 4}. Agents 1, 3 and 4, respectively, consume 890
31
, 122
31
and 1220
31
. The welfare is
then b1(
890
31
) + b3(
122
31
) + b4(
1220
31
) = 113110
31
< 3649. Therefore, {1, 3, 4} chooses not to
pass any water from 1 to {3, 4} and v(2) = b2(e2) = v(2).
Since e3 = xˆ3, we have v(i) = v(i) for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, by e2 < xˆ2,
v(2) < v(2, {{1, 4}, {2}, {3}}).
Finally, we show that the downstream incremental distribution violates the coop-
erative core lower bounds although we have v(i) = v(i) for all i ∈ N . Since e2 < xˆ2
and e3 = xˆ3, we obtain
v(2, 3) = v(2, {{1, 4}, {2}, {3}}) + v(3, {{1, 4}, {2}, {3}}) = b2(xˆ2) + b3(xˆ3) > v(2, 3).
Hence, by Theorem 3, z∗ violates the cooperative core lower bounds.
Remark 7 The analogue of the downstream incremental distribution is the upstream
incremental distribution u∗ deﬁned by u∗i = v(Fi) − v(F 0i) (here again it does not
matter how the agents in P 0i behave). One may wonder why it is the downstream
incremental distribution which is the most important distribution for our problems
(and why not others, for example u∗ which is the distribution corresponding to the
“hierarchical outcome” considered by Demange (2004)). One possible explanation
26
is the characterization (1)-(4) of optimal consumption plans. Here, the marginal
beneﬁts at this plan are weakly decreasing downstream meaning that agents more
downstream are closer to their optimal consumption. Of course, the same is true for
all coalitions. Therefore, distributions which satisfy core lower bounds must put more
“importance” on agents who are more downstream.
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APPENDIX.
Lemma 1 If S ⊆ T ⊆ N and T < i, then w(S ∪ i)− w(S) ≥ w(T ∪ i)− w(T ).
Proof. The proof follows Ambec and Sprumont (2002). As a ﬁrst step in the proof
of this lemma, let us show that if ∅ = S ⊂ T ⊂ N, then y∗(S) ≥ y∗S(T ). Clearly, it
suﬃces to establish that y∗(S) ≥ y∗S(S ∪ t) whenever ∅ = S = N and t ∈ N\S. Write
y∗(S) = x and y∗S(S ∪ t) = y. All agents under consideration in the argument belong
to S. By deﬁnition of x and y,
∑
i∈S(yi − xi) ≤ 0. Let i1 ≤ ... ≤ iL be those i such
that xi = yi (if none exists, there is nothing to prove). We claim that yiL − xiL < 0.
Suppose, by contradiction, that the opposite (necessarily strict) inequality is true.
Let j be the largest predecessor of iL such that yj −xj < 0 (which necessarily exists).
Moreover, yj < xˆj since xj ≤ xˆj. Deﬁne yεiL = yiL−ε, yεj = yj +ε, yεi = yi for i = iL, j.
Since b′j(yj) > b
′
j(xj) ≥ b′iL(xiL) > b′iL(yiL), choosing ε > 0 small enough (in particular
such that yj +  < xˆj ) ensures that
∑
i∈S(bi(y
ε
i )− bi(yi)) > 0 while yε meets the same
constraints as y, a contradiction. Because yiL − xiL < 0, it now follows that yil − xil
< 0 successively for l = L− 1, ..., 1.
Moving to the second step, let S ⊂ T ⊂ N and T < i. Deﬁne x′i = y∗i (T ∪ i) and
x′j = y
∗
j (T ∪ i)+ y∗j (S)− y∗j (T ) for j ∈ S. By our ﬁrst step, y∗j (T ∪ i) ≤ y∗j (T ) ≤ y∗j (S)
for all j ∈ S. Therefore 0 ≤ y∗j (T ∪ i) ≤ x′j ≤ y∗j (S) for all j ∈ S and the consumption
plan x′ for S ∪ i satisﬁes the same constraints as y∗(S ∪ i), namely,∑k∈Pj∩(S∪i) x′k ≤
∑
k∈Pj ek for all j ∈ S ∪ i. Hence, w(S ∪ i) ≥
∑
j∈S∪i bj(x
′
j) and
w(S ∪ i)− w(S) ≥ bi(x′i) +
∑
j∈S
[bj(x
′
j)− bj(y∗j (S))]. (13)
On the other hand, since y∗j (T ∪ i) ≤ y∗j (T ) for all j ∈ T\S,
w(T ∪ i)− w(T ) ≤ bi(x′i) +
∑
j∈S
[bj(y
∗
j (T ∪ i))− bj(y∗j (T ))]. (14)
Since x′j − y∗j (S) = y∗j (T ∪ i) − y∗j (T ) and y∗j (T ∪ i) ≤ x′j for all j ∈ S, it follows
from (13), (14), and the concavity of the beneﬁt functions on its increasing part that
w(T ∪ i)− w(T ) ≤ w(S ∪ i)− w(S). This completes the proof of the lemma. 
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